The Return of the Taliban

Favourite Quotes

“Afghanistan had been the graveyard of empires for a solid reason: It is not susceptible to unity” - p. 70, Biden¹

“In the land of poets, mystics, and melodies, peace is not - and cannot - be impossible.” - p. 253

Summary

Introduction

• Ghani, near the end of his time as president, became conspiratorial and thought the US was secretly working against him to install Abdul Ghani Baradar as leader of Afghanistan
  • he believed this because the US was pressuring him to make peace with the Taliban and agree to a power-sharing system of governance. Ghani obviously did not want that
• Ghani, the opposite the “US plan”, would feed information to Baradar’s rival in the Taliban, Sirajuddin Haqqani
  • in 2014, Haqqani helped Ghani win the election, so they had a history together
• Ghani refused to believe the Taliban would enter Kabul
  • even on August 14 2021, the day before the Kabul takeover, Ghani didn’t believe it
  • his right hand man, Hamdullah Muhib (National Security Advisor), received a call on this day from Khalil Haqqani warning him to “give up and get out”
  • his other right hand man, Amrullah Saleh, fled sometime on the 14th to the Panjshir Valley. He knew Ghani was a weak and indecisive ruler, so no point in staying with him
• On August 15, the Taliban entered Kabul
  • that same day, Muhib and Ghani fled via helicopter to Uzbekistan, then to UAE
• Many of the warlords also fled and didn’t put up any fight (Dostom, Ismail Khan, Atta Muhammad Noor, etc)
• So why didn’t the Afghan army fight?
  • they haven’t got paid for weeks, possibly months. They knew the Taliban are strong. What’s the point of fighting?
• Mistakes that were made leading up to the Kabul takeover
  • Ghani fired many of his top commanders in the army, thinking they were disloyal
    • this reduced morale in the army and “confused the war effort”
  • Ghani refusing to believe the Taliban would enter Kabul
  • the government not paying Afghan soldiers
• Taliban ‘eras’
  • Taliban 1.0 = 1994 - 2001
  • they were dormant between 2001-2003
  • Taliban 2.0 = 2003 - 2018.
    • their base was Quetta, Pakistan
  • Taliban 3.0 = 2018 - now
    • this is when they began talks with the US in Doha, Qatar
• the Taliban, if they are to be successful, need to act less like morality police and divert their energies towards being adequate administrators and dependable leaders
  • we’re not in the 90s anymore. They must adapt to the times.
• Why the Taliban were successful
  • bargaining with other powerful leaders/tribes
    • rather than fight them, the Taliban bargained and/or bribed them to not fight against the Taliban. The tribes agreed because they didn’t think the government would protect them
  • using social media
    • the spokesman for the Taliban, Zabihullah Mujahid, has over 700k Twitter followers
    • the Taliban have accounts on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
    • the Taliban have hired at least one public relations firm
    • in 2018, they made more posts than Afghanistan’s ministry of Defense, and in more languages. So the Taliban are very active
• Takeover plan
  • they first focused on their regional bases of power: the south
  • then they moved to surrounding districts
  • then they moved to the north and took over districts there
  • then they took control of the Iran, Tajikistan, and Pakistan border crossings
  • up until this point they avoided capital cities to avoid battles
  • instead they bribed tribal elders and Afghan forces to stand down and join them, which was successful
  • by early August, the Taliban marched on the major cities
  • the Taliban had planted spies in Kabul way before the takeover, so they were already adequately prepared

Chapter 1: The Road to Kabul: The Secret Deal, the New Taliban and a House of Cards

• Feb 2020 was a big time for the Taliban. A US-Taliban peace deal was created that was advantageous to the Taliban
  • part of it was release of 5k Taliban soldiers from Afghan prisons
• this was a huge moral victory for the Taliban which translated to winning more territory

Taliban Leadership Transitions

• Mullah Omar died in 2013, so the Taliban needed a new leader
• Omar had 2 close friends who were co-founders of the movement: Abdul Ghani Baradar and Mullah Ubaidullah Akhund
  • the latter died in 2010, so Baradar was the obvious choice
• Baradar was imprisoned by the ISI in 2010, so he was out of the picture for when Mullah Omar died and a new leader needed to be elected
• Mullah Mansour Akhtar succeeded Omar. He didn’t have a big name in the Taliban, but was involved since day 1
• Mansour was not a favourite among Taliban leaders, but his 2015 capture of Kunduz, the first provincial capital to fall in 14 years, made him gain favour with the Taliban leaders
  • Mansour was resourceful and had the support of the ISI, but he lacked clerical credentials and was an immoral man (had a bunch of Russian prostitutes in Dubai)
• Mansour chose 2 deputies:
  • Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada (the current supreme leader)
  • Sirajuddin Haqqani
• Mansour’s tenure ended in 2016 when he was killed in a US targeted drone strike in Pakistan
• Reasons for taking out Mansour
  • he was getting cozy to Iran, which Pakistan didn’t like. Pakistan needed a tight grip on the Taliban, the first step of that being to ensure their operations are based out in Pakistan (Quetta, Peshawar), but Mansour settled his family in Iran which is not a good sign
  • the US thought he was against any peace plan with the Afghan government… or at least that’s what they said. Likely Pakistan influenced this decision
  • he was way too close to the Dubai royal family. They protected him when the US was demanding Dubai arrests him.

The Rise of Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada - the Taliban’s New Supreme Leader

• Elected in 2016, he was Mansour’s deputy, so he was an obvious choice
  • As opposed to Sirajuddin, whose faction “The Haqqani Network” within the Taliban still wasn’t that strong/popular
• Hibatullah gained a ‘cult-following’. He is reclusive, secretive, doesn’t like being photographed, doesn’t know how to use a phone, is an expert in Islamic Sciences, was a top ranking judge in the first Taliban government, etc
• Hibatullah chose 2 deputies (he added a third in 2018)
  • Sirajuddin Haqqani
    • due to the fact he was the strongest, most capable military commander, Hibatullah had to keep him as deputy
  • Mullah Yaqoob: Omar’s son, only 26 at the time
  • 2018 addition: Abdul Ghani Baradar. He was released from prison in 2018
• He was based out in Quetta.
• Mullah Yaqoob was mainly in Karachi

Inside the Secret US-Taliban Negotiations in Doha (2018-2021)

• the Taliban issued an almost 3k word letter to the US in Feb 2018, asking them to come to the negotiation table
  • it worked. It also helped that Trump wanted to get out of Afghanistan so he was more than happy to negotiate. He’s a business man afterall!
• Trump appointed the best man for the job to represent the US in the negotiation: Zalmay Khalilzad “Zal”
• The biggest concern for the US was they weren’t sure if the Taliban were really united behind the scenes
  • The Taliban commanders in the field were being led by leaders in Quetta. But do the commanders truly listen to everything their Quetta-based leaders say?
  • When Taliban Quetta leaders asked their commanders in the field if they’d accept a peace agreement from Doha, half of them rejected!
• the lead negotiator for the Taliban in 2018 was Stanikzai
• US goals for the Doha talks:
  • Taliban renunciation of Al-Qaeda
  • end of hostilities and political settlement with Afghan gov and Taliban
  • long-term presence of US intelligence and counter-terrorism in Afghanistan
• Taliban goals for Doha talks:
  • complete US withdrawal, including any US intelligence
  • their own political system
• their goals were in direct conflict!. But in Jan 2019, that changed:
  • Trump ordered to comply with Taliban requirements; the US will withdraw to ZERO troops
  • in return, Stanikzai agreed that they’ll renounce all terrorism and not allow Afghanistan to be used as a base of terrorist operations, and they’ll use any mechanism the US wants for enforcement
• so far Kabul was still NOT involved, per the Taliban request
  • the Taliban viewed them as illegitimate as they viewed the country as under occupation by the US. So they only wanted to talk to the US
• 2019 was a good year for negotiations
  • Baradar took over the Doha office. He was soft-spoken, more rational, and so the negotiations proceeded better
    • he was also independent of Pakistan. In other words, he represented another side of the Taliban
  • the Taliban team was very diverse, representing all sides of the Taliban
  • the US and Taliban teams were more comfortable with each other. Zal and Baradar were even joking with each other
• the peace agreement was finally signed on Feb 29 2020
  • the US would fully pull out by May 2021
  • Taliban would commit to not allow Afghanistan to be used as a grounds against the security of the US and her allies and negotiate with Kabul
  • each side would release prisoners

The End

• Ghani was stubborn and wanted it “my way or the highway” when it came to negotiating with the Taliban, so it all fell through
• Biden took office and said by September 11 2021, all US troops will be out

“The new edifice of an overcentralized and unaccountable Afghan state was unsustainable” - p. 70

• ^ that quote sums it up. Two problems:
  • over-centralization: this simply CANNOT work in Afghanistan
  • unaccountable: corruption was running rampant, largely due to the US which is thoroughly explained in The Afghanistan Papers - A Secret History of the War

Chapter 2: From Insurgency to Governance: Who’s Who in Afghanistan Today?

• it’s important to note that no one, not even US intelligence, was expecting the Taliban to takeover Kabul that quickly
• 3 methods used by the Taliban to gain influence:
  • bribery
  • tribal alliances
  • fear/terror
• it’s also important to note that not a single bullet was shot by the Taliban in Kabul. No one opposed them
  • earlier in August when the Taliban took over the other major cities (Herat, Kandahar, Mazar, etc), it was the same story: no fighting, they peacefully tookover
• Ghani alongside other major Afghan leaders, all left without a fight. They reneged on their promise to defend Afghanistan to their last breath
  • 2 exception: Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, who both remained in Kabul
• The effects of the 2020 Doha Agreements:
  • these agreements severely demoralized the Afghan military and government. Many soldiers defected to the Taliban. Why stick with a losing army/government?
  • the Afghans knew they were dependent on US support, and with them leaving, they knew they were going to lose eventually

Inside Kabul: The Taliban Assumption of Power

• there were 2 factions of Taliban who tookover Kabul:
  • Sirajuddin Haqqani
  • Mullah Yaqoob
  • they each went after the Interior Ministry and Defense Ministry
• Taliban are not united, there are 5 groups:
  1. “Moderates”: they were the face of the Doha negotiations
  2. the Quetta Shura: hardliners, they are the current ideological brain. The stereotypical Taliban
     1. the Peshawar Shura: they represent and manage the eastern provinces to balance the bias of the southern/Kandahari Quetta Shura. They emerged in 2005
  3. Commanders/fighters: they are the military/physical side
  4. Organized criminal groups: drug dealers and other criminals simply taking advantage of the chaos
  5. Ordinary villagers: the largest. They joined the Taliban largely due to tribal affiliations/allegiances, or opposition to Kabul
• in September, the chief of the ISI arrived in Afghanistan to help choose the next cabinet
  • in other words, he wanted to ensure the Taliban government represented the people loyal to Pakistan
  • he ensured that Hibatullah and his loyal deputies, Sirajuddin and Yaqoob held important roles
• Baradar was pushed to the sideline. He was America’s favourite because he was moderate, forward-thinking, and pro-negotiation and willing to work with the Americans to a certain degree
  • he was also Mullah Omar’s choice of successor! But as mentioned earlier he went to jail so he was on the sidelines for a long time

Taliban 3.0?

• on August 17, the Taliban held their first press conference
  • they assured the world they have changed, evolved. They even invited women to join the government! They seemed like a changed group
• on September 7 2021, they announced a new 33 member cabinet. They called it a temporary cabinet:
  • at the head of them all is the Supreme Leader, Hibatullah
  • next in line is the Prime Minister. They chose 70 year old Mullah Hasan Akhund
    • the most appropriate person would’ve been Baradar, but the ISI didn’t like him
  • Hasan Akhund had 2 deputy prime ministers
    • Baradar and Mullah Abdul Salam Hanafi
      • Hanafi is an ethnic Uzbek and Islamic Scholar. He is considered to be part of the moderate group of the Taliban. He participated in the Doha negotiations
      • he’s one of the only non-Pashtuns in Taliban senior leadership
  • 2 ministry roles are the most important in the cabinet
    • Interior Minister: Sirajuddin Haqqani
      • this was a “fuck you” to the US because Siraj is part of the US most wanted list
      • he’s in charge of security and policing across the country
    • Defense Minister: Mullah Yaqoob
      • he is considered to be part of the moderate group of the Taliban
      • he’s a favourite of Saudi Arabia
    • these make sense considering they were the main commanders on the field, Yaqoob being in charge of the south (14 provinces) and Siraj the southeast (20 provinces)
  • 30/33 cabinet positions went to Pashtuns, making the Taliban’s idea of an inclusive government meaningless
• what qualifications do you need to (easily) land a job for the Taliban government?
  • Pashtun background
  • link to Pakistan either via membership in the Quetta or Peshawar Shura, or alumni status with Darul Uloom Haqqania seminary
    • the surname “Haqqani” is not a tribe, but rather some alumni take that name to represent their school.
    • that’s where “The Haqqani Network”
• Taliban leaders who are really close to Pakistan: - Siraj Haqqani, and his uncle Khalil Haqqani - Khalil is minister of refugees - Khalil is also the Taliban’s go-to mediator for “jirgas” - Amir Khan Muttaqi; Foreign minister
• Ultra-conservative members:
  • Noor Muhammad Saqib
    • he was chief justice in the first (90s) government
    • he’s currently minister of hajj
    • he is staunchly anti-Shia and is responsible for a lot of sectarian violence. Even his school, Darul Uloom Haqqania has cautioned him to be careful with his ‘takfiri’ views
• The more moderate members are typically the younger ones, they are often graduates of The International Islamic University of Islamabad, a Saudi funded school that is more modern, moderate, and not really a traditional madrassa
  • one prominent member is Dr Naeem Wardak, a PhD from this school. He represents the Taliban in the political office in Doha
• evolution of the Taliban:
  • they did not ban sports, in fact the role of the head of the cricket board was desired by many Taliban members!
  • they appointed many women in senior roles at maternity hospitals
  • the modern Taliban are certainly changed; they want to gain international approval. They do not want to return to their old ways.
• besides the cabinet, the positions of governors of provinces is important
  • Hibatullah appoints the governors and changes them every 1-2 years it seems. Likely the reason is he doesn’t want any one governor building a base of power in a province for their own selfish gain
• another group besides the cabinet and governors is the Rahbari Shura, or the Leadership Council
  • they are composed of senior Taliban officials and act as advisors to the Supreme Leader.

The Taliban’s Theory of Governance

• another person acting outside the cabinet and the Rahbari Shura is the head of the Supreme Court, currently held by Abdul Hakim Haqqani (Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai)
  • he wrote a book outlining the Taliban system of government
• this book is not a policy document, but the supreme leader Hibatullah wrote a preface to it, which indicates the ideas and opinions in this book reflect that of the Taliban circle in Kandahar
• ideas from the book:
  • democracy is wrong
  • tolerance to religious minorities should not be shown, at least in the since that everyone needs to follow Hanafi fiqh and will be judged according to Hanafi fiqh
  • the education system has destroyed Afghanistan, and a religiously-centered education must be taught instead
  • woman’s purpose is to be wives and mothers
  • women can receive education, but only at home. If they must leave the house for education, it must be from a female teacher
  • women cannot leave the house with a need
• the problem is this: the ideological foundation of the Taliban are spearheaded by Hibatullah and his chief judge, Abdul Hakim Haqqani.
  • we know they are both hardliners, so the task the moderates have of reforming the Taliban is going to be extremely difficult

Chapter 3: Taliban.Gov: Policies, Politics, and Internal Rivalries

• the Taliban are quite diverse, some stick with their Kandahari roots, some are Pakistan influenced, some are Doha influenced, etc. So because of this they do have different opinions and policies

The First Test: Issues around Women and Girls’ Education

• in their first reign in the 90s, they enforced the burka. This time around, they are recommending it, but not enforcing it
• when it came to women issues, it’s clear that there’s an internal ‘war’ between the old and new Taliban
  • for example, in 10/34 provinces, female high schools continued to operate!
  • this is clear from the fact that initially the Taliban in Kabul promised to let girls go to school, then retracted their decision a year or 2 later. It’s because there’s 2 opinions in the Taliban
• the rulings come from Kandahar, and there there are 3 ultra-conservative clerics in Hibatullah’s ear:
  • chef justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani
  • minister of religious affairs Noor Muhammad Saqib
  • minister for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice Muhammad Khalid Hanafi

The Second Test: Policy Toward Muslim Minorities

• the Hazaras are mistreated due to being Shia and Hazara, an ethnic minority
• the new 2021 Taliban seem to have a changed attitude on this; they are no longer mistreating Hazaras, in fact, the Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen said “The Hazara Shia for us are also Muslim… we have started a new page. We do not want to be entangled with the past”
• they are also offering protection to Shia religious gatherings

The Third Test: Financial Crisis

• the Afghan economy is still in a desire state
• the Taliban appointed Baradar as Prime Minister of Economy, largely due to the fact that he has a good reputation with foreign powers
  • he’s a moderate, so other Taliban leaders won’t listen to his domestic opinions, but at least he can be used to put on a good face for foreigners - Taliban reasoning

The Challenge of Internal Cohesion: Jealousies and Fractures

• the Taliban internal rivalries never get to a level of fractures, they all know that sticking together as one group is good in the long term
• Mullah Yaqoob views himself as the rightful successor
  • when prime minister Hassan Akhund suggested Baradar as next in line, Yaqoob refused
  • Yaqoob was supported by Siraj, despite having their own rivalry
• Siraj and Yaqoob only sided with Hibatullah for politics, not religion
  • both of them disagree with Hibatullah’s hardline views… Siraj openly called for girls’ schools to reopen in march 2022
  • they know that if they are to one day become leader, they need the support of clerics around Hibatullah
  • both of them are pro-US relations
• Baradar’s future as Taliban leadership is not looking good
  • both the Haqqani and Pakistan-influenced factions are against him
  • his health is worth than Hibatullah’s health
• Siraj and Yaqoob are rivals. Both are excellent candidates as future supreme leaders
  • allegedly they have resorted to spying on each other
• the presidential palace is effectively split into 4 zones. People are BODY-SEARCHED when they go to a different zone. Each zone is controlled by a different faction
  1. prime minister Hassan Akhund
  2. shared by Baradar and Yaqoob
  3. Siraj
  4. deputy prime minister Maulvi Kabir

Looking for Legitimacy: Hibatullah Speaks in Kabul

• he held a gathering of 4000 tribal elders, provincial representatives, etc, in Kabul
• it was a men’s only event. He said that the men can transmit the message to their women at home

What are Pragmatic Taliban Elements Up To?

• the pragmatists include Yaqoob, Baradar, Siraj, and Khairullah Khairkhwa
• they are not happy with the edicts coming from Kandahar
• these pragmatists simply ignore some edicts from Kandahar
  • this is obviously not a good strategy long-term, but they have no other option
• Baradar and finance minister Gul Agha Ishaqzai, a leader of the “Kandahari Taliban” had an early confrontation when they took power in 2021
  • Baradar was in favour of an inclusive government, working with international partners. Ishaqzai is not

The Way Ahead

• women’s rights is what’s holding back any international partner from working with the Taliban
• a senior US official had a meeting with the Doha delegation: Stanikzai, Abdul Salam Hanafi, and Suhail Shaheen
  • the US official said that these guys are more than willing to work with the US. They are pragmatists.

Chapter 4: Deobandism, Islam and the Religious Narratives of the Taliban

Deobandism and Revivalist Islam

• The Taliban are deobandis with influence from Salafism/Wahhabism, especially with their links to Al-Qaeda
• another big influence for the Taliban is Pashtunwali and tribalism
• it’s important to note that deobandis are diverse. Some are very against the Taliban. They have lots of opinions within their own group.

The Historical Context of Deoband

• the fundamental concept is that the clerics run the show. Society has become unislamic, and only the clerics can bring them back to Islam.
  • problem: society has drifted away from Islam
  • solution: the clerics bring Islam back
  • this ensures the clerical class keep the power
• the Deobandis started off as an ideological movement opposing British colonialism in India. Then slowly became a military movement to fight the British

Placing the Taliban in the Deobandi Framework

• the Taliban are certainly deobandi in origin, we cannot separate the two, but the Taliban do not represent the entirety of deobandi thought

Sufism in Afghanistan

• Afghanistan was always called “the home of saints”
• Sufism was always the dominant strain of Islam. People loved their saints, shrines, and poetry
• entire Sufi orders were founded in Afghanistan
• famous Sufis like Rumi originated in Afghanistan
• the Taliban are staunchly anti-Sufi, but do not consider them kafir like ISIS-K
• Sufism is now a minority in Afghanistan

The Taliban as a New Religious Movement

• it’s safe to say that the Taliban as this point can be viewed as an entirely new religious movement, similar to how Deobandism was in the 1800s

Taliban Narratives and the Contemporary Muslim World

• it’s important to understand historical context; Taliban did not appear out of nowhere
• Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviets, then the US.
• the influence of communism was tearing apart Afghan way of life (or least some Afghans felt that way)
• it was these factors that led to the formation of the Taliban. Without them, the Taliban would likely not exist
• Further reading on the rise of the Taliban:
  • 1996-2001 The Taliban
  • Rise of the Taliban

Chapter 5: Allies and Enemies of the Taliban: The Pakistani Taliban and ISK (Islamic State in Khorasan)

• the rise of the Afghan Taliban has led to the rise of the Pakistani Taliban. They feel emboldened ever since the Afghan Taliban took control of the country in 2021

The Pakistani Taliban

• FATA (federally administered tribal areas), i.e. Pakistan’s Pakhtunkhwa, has been a home for Mujahideen, jihadis, and terrorists
  • it is a hard to reach area which is why it’s a popular destination for those types of people
• the Pakistani Taliban, TTP, emerged in 2007
  • they declared Mullah Omar their spiritual leader
  • they’ve committed acts of violence and terrorism against Pakistan, such as suicide bombings
• Pakistan army went after this group in 2007-2015, and as a result they splintered off into smaller groups
  • many of them pledged allegiance to ISK
• when the Afghan Taliban took control in 2021, many of the factions of TTP joined forces together
• the roots of the Pakistani Taliban are planted in the fact that Pashtuns have not been treated the best in Pakistan
  • they are not part of the ‘mainstream’
  • only in 2018 was FATA merged into Pakhtunkhwa, even then there was no benefit given to them due to this merger
• Siraj Haqqani is the favourite guy of the ISI and Pakistan
  • but he doesn’t solely rely on Pakistan, he also has a good relationship with the gulf countries including Saudi Arabia
• Afghan Taliban have been distancing themselves from the Pakistani government
  • they know Pakistan has a bad reputation among Afghans
  • additionally, they refused to go after TTP insurgents living in east Afghanistan. This prompted Pakistan to launch strikes killing Afghan civilians. The Taliban responded angrily on Twitter warning Pakistan not to test their patience
  • why are they refusing to go after TTP? Because they know that if they do, the TTP insurgents will join ISK, further fueling the ISK problem in Afghanistan. The core of ISK are former TTP members
  • on top of that, TTP and Afghan Taliban do have a relationship together along ethnic and tribal lines

The Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK)

• points of disagreements between Taliban and ISK
  • treatment of minorities: the Taliban were very anti-Shia previously, but now are more lukewarm. The ISK views this as a “betrayal of ideology”
  • working with the west: ISK views the negotiations between Taliban and US as very wrong. This also helped them gain lots of soldiers because some people are leaving the Taliban due to that reason and joining ISK
• ISK’s first chief was a former member of TTP. They then started to recruit disgruntled members from TTP
  • then they recruited non-Pashtuns fighting in Kashmir, Turks like Uzbeks, Turkmens, Uyghur, and even former al-Qaeda members
• ISK made a huge revival in 2020 when Doha negotiations began. More attacks started happening
  • during Taliban’s first year of rule, ISK committed 262 attacks, most of which were against Taliban members
• some estimate that ISK could control 20% of Afghan territory by mid-2023 (not true)
• on the other hand, some believe the Taliban are exaggerating the ISK threat
  • this helps them gain sympathy from the international community since they are fighting a bigger threat
  • it gives the Taliban a way to kill political opponents and just say “it was an ISK member”
• the dilemma Taliban face is if they become too moderate, they run the risk of mass defection to ISK
• ISK are at a disadvantage:
  • they don’t have an ethnic population to draw from (they are multi ethnic)
  • they don’t have a madrassa network to draw from because Salafism is not common in Afghanistan

Chapter 6: The International Relations of the Taliban

• The Taliban have established communication with the foreign ministries of Germany, China, India, and Russia
  • this indicates they are open to working with international partners
  • it’s important to note that no country including the above have officially “recognized/endorsed” the Taliban
• The Taliban want international cooperation and recognition because it helps them. Once they get that legitimacy, the doors for international aid open up, and since Afghanistan is in a dire economic situation, that would greatly help the Taliban government

China

• China began diplomatic communication with Taliban in 2014
• China is concerned over security and terrorism mainly, just because of how close each country is from each other
  • they are concerned over the Uyghur military threat
• China applauded Taliban’s takeover of the country in 2021
• China also is interested in the economic opportunities of developing Afghanistan
  • there’s $3 trillion worth of mineral mines in Afghanistan
• the west is busy with Russia-Ukraine, so that’s why the Taliban are looking to China for help

Iran

• like China, Iran also kept their embassy open when the Taliban tookover, indicating they are willing to work with the Taliban
• Iran was secretly supporting the Taliban during the 2000s because they suspected the Taliban would eventually win
• Since 2021 many Taliban members and their families moved to Iran
• one of the reasons for cooperation is that ISK is also a threat to Iran, so Iran has an interest in helping Taliban combat ISK

Qatar

• Qatar’s history with Taliban goes back to the 90s when they sent someone to convince Mullah Omar not to destroy the Bamyan Buddhas
• Qatar hosted the Doha negotiations for the Taliban. This was a HUGE help for the Taliban
• in October 2022, Qatar hosted a meeting between CIA deputy chief and Taliban head of intelligence Abdul Haq Wasiq to discuss the ISK threat

Russia

• Russia since the fall of Taliban in the 90s has been backing the US fight against Taliban
• in 2015, Russia changed their policy. They started working with the Taliban to combat ISK that was threatening Central Asia
• Russia invited Taliban to Moscow in 2018 for peace talks
• The Taliban were invited to many peace talks hosted by Russia from 2017-2019
• Russia’s interest:
  • security in Central Asia; ISK threat. This would spill into Russia
  • drug trafficking from Afghanistan coming through central Asia to Russia is a threat to their domestic security
• Russia like Iran and China also kept their embassy and did not evacuate when Kabul was captured
• The Taliban have urged Russia to end their conflict in Ukraine

India

• they had a bad relationship up until 2021
  • they closed their embassy when Taliban took over
  • they were staunch supporters of the US and Karzai/Ghani governments
• since 2021, they are starting to realize they need to gain Taliban trust and win influence in Afghanistan to maintain their own security
  • they don’t want Afghanistan to become a terrorist safe-haven because that could spill into Kashmir
• India is cautious because of the Taliban’s close relationship with Pakistan
• in August 2022 however, the sent a diplomatic mission to Afghanistan, indicating they are willing to let the past be the past

Turkey

• Turkey has been neutral mainly, but more recently has become more pro-Taliban
• their main interest is to have influence in the region of Central Asia
• they also have economic interest in developing Afghanistan
• Turkey met with Taliban minister of Education in March 2022 to build a religious and science based curriculum

Emerging Taliban Foreign Policy

• The Taliban have a big task ahead of them: they adopted a country full of issues, economically, humanitarian, terrorism, etc
• many countries are in the race of ‘developing’ Afghanistan so they can exploit Afghan resources (minerals, mines, etc)

Conclusion: The Future of the Taliban

• to conclude, the international community must ACCEPT the fact the Taliban now rule Afghanistan. They must at least establish communications with them to ease the humanitarian crisis
• The Taliban have the following problems to solve:
  • how to move from being a terrorist org to recognized government
  • how to ensure the varying perspectives of their members does not lead to dissent or internal conflict
    • this relates to the urban-rural divide where rural folks are more conservative
  • how to deal with and destroy the ISK threat
  • how to deal with Pakistan: on the one hand they need Pakistan support since they are a close friend and ally, on the other hand the Afghan people will always view Taliban as a Pakistani proxy unless the Taliban distance themselves
• differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Taliban
  • the old were okay with being isolated, while the new yearn for international recognition
  • the old were strict against the media, not allowing for freedom, while the new are a lot more relaxed towards the media, even foreign media
  • the old were a lot more centered around ideas of religion and international jihad, while the new are more focused on their Afghan identity and nationalism
  • the old were more focused on sectarianism, while the new are not, in fact they are making moves to protect minorities like the Shia
  • the old were a hybrid of Deobandi and Al-Qaeda ideologies, like “militant Deobandism”. The new are going back to the roots of classical Deobandism
    • especially since they now have an enemy in ISK, who has more of an Al-Qaeda ideology, is more extreme, and anti-Deobandi
  • the old were a more disorganized ‘warrior’ movement while the new, even before they took power in 2021, are more organized and more ‘governmental’

Main Ideas

• the US knew the Taliban were going to takeover years before they did, that’s why they were negotiating for so long
• The Taliban and Pakistan are EXTREMELY close allies. This is not a good look for Taliban because most Afghans hate Pakistan
• The Taliban are a united group, but have lots of differing opinions, some are more moderate while others are more hardline. In future years this might end up becoming a huge problem - example: some Taliban leaders are okay with women going to school and being in public without burqa
• The ‘new’ Taliban are certainly SIGNIFICANTLY different than the ‘old’ 90s Taliban.
• if the Taliban are to survive, they need to build relationships with the international community. In order to do that, they need to become more ‘moderate’ - the younger Taliban and even some of the old are ‘moderate’, so as long as that becomes the majority the Taliban will do just fine

Footnotes

1. when the people you’re trying to ‘conquer’ are not united, it is as if you’re fighting multiple different enemies, which makes it exponentially harder for you as a conqueror. ↩