The Afghanistan Papers - A Secret History of the War

Favourite Quotes

“why did we create a centralized government in a place that has never had one?” - p. 37

“I’ve raised my sheep and goats and vegetables on this piece of land for hundreds of years and not had a central government. Why do I need one now?” - p. 38, an Afghan civilian

Summary

Part 1: A False Taste of Victory, 2001-2002

Chapter 1: A Muddled Mission

• problem: no ‘end game’ was defined
  • the US military/government had no exit strategy for Afghanistan
  • in military strategy, you are taught to never start a war unless you have a plan to end it, i.e. an ‘end game’
• the US defeated and toppled the Taliban within 6 weeks of starting the war… shouldn’t that have been the end?
• problem: unclear objectives
  • it started as “bring al-Qaeda to justice”, then “get rid of the Taliban/regime change”, then “get rid of any group affiliated with the Taliban”, then “nation state building based on the US model”, etc
• the US was well-aware of history, which is why during this time they were anxious about putting too many soldiers on the ground and staying too long
  • throughout history, anyone who said a tad bit too long eventually loses, often drastically
• the overthrow of the Taliban was UNEXPECTED; they simply didn’t think it’d be that easy
  • the US military faced a dilemma: due to how fast the Taliban fell, they worried the country would fall into chaos. At the same time, if they send more soldiers they feared the expectation to solve Afghanistan’s problems would fall onto them
• the US did not expect and did NOT want a long war
  • at the beginning, Bagram air base was tiny without a shower. The soldiers had been there for 30 days without taking a shower! Eventually they had a 6 person shower installed
  • years later, Bagram air base held 30k people with an entire shopping mall!
• militarily it seemed like the US had won, in fact, many platoons of US soldiers were STRUGGLING to find any battles to fight
  • as one officer said, his entire troop played video games all day
• problem: invasion of Iraq
  • in 2003, the US invaded Iraq. All eyes in the government/military were off Afghanistan and on Iraq
  • Bush didn’t even know who the general in charge of Afghanistan was - p. 15

Chapter 2: Who Are the Bad Guys?

• problem: no one in the US government/military knew who the true enemy was
  • the lines between civilian and combatant were blurred; they both dressed the same and carried AKs
  • the line between Al-Qaeda and Taliban were blurred; they were both extremists, but one on a global scale while the other local
• Al-Qaeda were wiped out of Afghanistan by 2002, so from then on the US were fighting people who had NOTHING to do with 9/11
• problem: the US were easily manipulated by the anti-Taliban forces
  • various elements of the Northern Alliance tricked the US into fighting their personal battles
  • what they would do is tell the US that X person is Taliban, and the US would bomb them, when in reality that X person is just a rival tribe that has a feud going back a century with the other guy
• many of the firefights that occurred in places like Kandahar were not between US and Taliban, but rather just some pissed off locals who don’t like foreign invaders. It just goes to show that no one had any idea how to identify the true enemy
• problem: the Taliban were not involved in the Bonn Conference in Germany
  • some Taliban commanders, after losing, wanted to participate, but they were refused
  • the US made a grave mistake: they violated Afghan way of war
    • When one side wins, the other side puts down their arms and reconciles with the side that won - p. 27
    • instead, the US hunted the Taliban down as if they were all criminals
  • whether the US liked it or not, the Taliban were a strong force in Afghanistan. Not allowing them to participate in nation building was ill-advised
  • another reason was that the US thought they ‘defeated’ the Taliban and they no longer existed in any real capacity, so why bother including them in future talks? They were wrong
  • Even Zalmay Khalilzad, the Afghan-born US diplomat in the Bush and Trump governments, said that if the US had included the Taliban in peace talks in 2001, then the war would’ve been MUCH shorter - p. 28

Chapter 3: The Nation-Building Project

• at the beginning of the war, Bush made it clear to the American public that the US will not be dragged into nation-building… then in Jan 2002 he announced the opposite!
• Afghanistan was and is poor. They had nothing in 2001. Their bank vaults were empty. Nation building was going to be a giant undertaking
  • the US spend $140+ billion on rebuilding Afghanistan, and it didn’t amount to anything
• US and her allies split up the work of nation building
  • Germans took up building an Afghan police force
  • Italians took up creating a justice system
  • British took up the task to discourage opium farming
• So why did the US start nation-building? What was the incentive?
  • they were afraid if they didn’t, the country would descend into chaos (like post-Soviet time), and the Taliban and Al-Qaeda would creep back in
• problem: no clear goals/objectives with nation building
  • the US government was unclear on what it’s goals were. So all the leaders and personnel they sent were simply confused on what they needed to do
• problem: the US forced Afghanistan to adopt a US-based style of government
  • this meant centralization of power in Kabul, in the hands of President Karzai
  • the US did this because they wanted to weaken the regional warlords and they thought Karzai was the “perfect man”, an English speaking Tribal Chief who was pro-USA
  • many western (US and EU) official later on said this was a BIG MISTAKE
  • Why was this a mistake?
    • one US official said “why did we create a centralized government in a place that has never had one?” - p. 37
    • one Afghan said “I’ve raised my sheep and goats and vegetables on this piece of land for hundreds of years and not had a central government. Why do I need one now?” - p. 38
    • the point is that Afghans did not care, and did not want a centralized government. They weren’t even familiar with the concept of taxes (they thought it was simply stealing). They didn’t even know how Karzai looked like. If anything, he was just purely the ruler of Kabul.

Part 2: The Great Distraction, 2003-2005

Chapter 4: Afghanistan Becomes an Afterthought

• problem: The US invaded Iraq, thus having 2 simultaneous wars
  • the US has never done this before. It is foreign policy 101 to never have 2 wars going on at the same time
  • most US officials were more concerned with Iraq at this time
  • many officers complained of not having enough supplies, soldiers, etc, because all resources were going towards Iraq
• at this time, many officers and high ranking political officials in Afghanistan or involved with it, knew they the US wasn’t leaving anytime soon. The situation was simply too unstable. They felt like they needed to stay until the new government became stable.
• 2004 the Afghan election took place. It went down without a hitch. This was a pretty big win for Rumsfield (Secretary of Defense) and other stakeholders in Afghan affairs from the US side.

Chapter 5: Raising an Army from the Ashes

• in 2003 the US started training a new Afghan army… this would end up a disaster
• problem: the US started too late
  • if they had started right when they defeated the Taliban, it would’ve been much better. Instead they started this army when the Taliban were back in business. Therefore they had to train too many Afghans TOO quickly
• problem: they didn’t understand their target audience; the Afghan recruits
  • the Afghan recruits had 80-90% illiteracy rate. The training was done in English via translators
    • how do you expect Afghan illiterate folk to take a PowerPoint seriously?
• problem: the US was trying to create a US style military
  • they didn’t bother understanding the style and strength of the Afghans. The Afghans have always been a fighting people historically, they know how to fight. But they have their own methods.
  • they constructed barracks and other structures to US/western standards. The Afghans had no idea how anything worked
    • some Afghans thought urinals were drinking fountains! P. 63
• problem: the US didn’t prepare and didn’t have a clear idea at the beginning
  • they were hesitant as the beginning, then as time went by they poured more and more money into it. At first they only pledged to support a 50k army, then the number rose to 300k+. There was a clear lack of any logical planning here.
  • the US also had no experience creating a whole army from scratch, nor did they prepare for it. They simply figured it out on the fly
• some US personnel reported the Afghan recruits were very committed, while others said the Afghan recruits were lazy - p. 64
  • this ties into the fact that the US did not bother understanding Afghan culture and society
  • why would any Afghan be committed to defend the central government who they have no relation to? Who they have no reason to care for? These are tribal people.
• problem: the policing system
  • the pay for police was incredibly low, so that bred a culture of corruption and bribery among Afghan cops
  • policing was a foreign concept to Afghans, especially in rural areas. So it simply did not work
    • got a problem? You go to the village elder, not the police - p. 66

Chapter 6: Islam for Dummies

• problem: the US made some pretty big epic fails when it came to the psy-op campaigns
  • psychological operation campaigns were conducted in an effort to bring ideas of nationalism, democracy, etc, to Afghan youths
  • their fails all come from simply NOT understanding Afghan culture and religion
  • they put religious words on soccer balls thinking that’d be good… Afghans were shocked to see religious words being KICKED around
  • they put the Afghan flag on soccer balls with the words ‘peace and unity’ written in Pashto and Dari… none of the kids even LOOKED at the words, they just immediately started playing
• problem: the US didn’t bother training their army in Afghan customs
  • usually soldiers going overseas are trained in the language, customs, and culture of their destination country. None of that happened
  • a lot of the training was focused around Iraq… they thought that all Muslim countries are the same
• examples of misunderstood cultural norms:
  • meetings: Americans are used to 1 hour meetings. Afghans have 3 hour meetings minimum - p. 71-72
  • time: Americans are used to being on time. Afghans can’t even tell the time
    • if the US army said we need to leave at X time for this mission, the Afghans would push back and says “why do we have to leave at that time?”
  • this whole chapter contains examples

Chapter 7: Playing Both Sides

• the question is: what role did Pakistan play? Which side were they on?
• It’s clear that Pakistan was a safe-haven for both Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and the US has no jurisdiction on Pakistani soil, so they couldn’t do much
• many times in 2003, there were battles near the border, with Pakistani border patrol firing AGAINST US soldiers
• Pakistan played both sides
  • on the one hand, in order to gain US trust, they assisted them in capturing terrorists. In exchange they got $10 billion in aid
  • on the other hand, Pakistan has a vested interest in having control over Afghanistan, or at least being a strong supporter of the Afghan government. In the 90s Pakistan supported the Taliban, and that support continued even after the Taliban collapsed
• the head of Pakistan’s ISI, Ashfaq Kayani, said: “One day you’ll be gone again (referring to US), it’ll be like Afghanistan the first time (post Soviet withdrawal), you’ll be done with us, but we’re still going to be here because we can’t actually move the country. And the last thing we want with all of our other problems is to have turned the Taliban into a mortal enemy.” - p. 87
  • he basically admitted that the ISI continue to support Taliban because they know once the US is gone, the Taliban are the most likely to take power, and it’s best to be allied with whatever government rules Afghanistan

Part 3: The Taliban Comes Back, 2006-2008

Chapter 8: Lies and Spin

• in 2007 the Taliban came very close to assassinating VP Dick Cheney - p. 91 - 93
• 2006 marked a stark increase in suicide and bomb attacks by the Taliban, and overall was the year where the war escalated to new levels
• the entire conflict was fueled by the Taliban safe haven in Pakistan. The Pakistani government refused to do anything about it
• around this time, military personnel continued to tell lie after lie about ‘progress’ being made in the war against Taliban and brining stability to Afghanistan. In reality, no progress was being made
• The Taliban warned the US saying: “you have all the clocks but we have all the time” - p. 95
  • the Taliban were in for a long war… but was the US prepared? No
• retired US general McCaffrey conducted an independent assessment in 2006
  • his verdict: “The insurgents would soon adopt a strategy of waiting us out” - p. 98
  • he said the Afghan army was under-resourced
  • he said the Afghan police was useless, undertrained, and riddled with corruption
  • he said it’d take 14 years, until 2020 for the Afghan police to operate independently of US help
• as one official said, the enemy (Taliban) are not that strong, it’s just that the Afghan government in Kabul is extremely weak
  • this is why centralization does NOT work in Afghanistan
• problem: the US didn’t know who was fighting them
  • page 100-101
  • many army officials would say they’d be under fire, but they’d never know from whom
  • it could be the Taliban, or a local militia under a warlord, or a drug gang protecting their turf, or someone who has grievances against the west
  • example: one Afghan said, in response to why he shot at the British troops and not US, “because the British came and killed my grandfather and great-grandfather” - p. 101
  • basically: there’s many reasons why people fight in Afghanistan. So for the US, this was a very complicated situation
• problem: the Taliban were not, and are not, a unified group - p. 101-102
  • a US general asked an Afghan general to tell him about the Taliban
  • he said: which Taliban? There’s 3 types:
    • the radical terrorists
    • the ones just in it for themselves (probably warlords, people wanting power)
    • the poor and ignorant who are influenced by the other 2 groups; the majority
  • the Afghan told him that if you want establish peace, you must separate the poor & ignorant from the other 2 groups

Chapter 9: An Incoherent Strategy

• even other NATO allies like Britain complained about the lack of strategy - p. 108
• still around this time (2007) the US was busy in Iraq, so Afghanistan was not given proper attention
• problem: there were many elements operating in Afghanistan, but the communication and team work was lacking
  • the CIA would not talk to US forces, NATO would not talk to Afghan police, Afghan Army would not talk to xyz, etc
  • there was no coordinated effort
• still during this time, US government and army officials were lying to the public, saying they were ‘winning’ while at the same time in private interviews they would admit no progress was being made

Chapter 10: The Warlords

• problem: the US wanted to strip power from the warlords, thus further centralizing power in Kabul
  • the entirety of Afghan politics works via regional power centers, and therefore ‘warlords’ or tribal leaders ruling them… you can’t just get rid of something so vital to Afghan society
• the US solution was to bring the warlords, like Dostom, into the Afghan government
  • this led to corruption since a lot of these guys weren’t good people. And putting them in positions of power in a CENTRALIZED government would only make corruption skyrocket
• as much as the US wanted to cut ties with the warlords due to their many crimes and horrible human rights track record, they simply couldn’t
  • the warlords were too valuable of assets. The US relied on them heavily. And at least the warlords were capable leaders/ruler of their areas
• example of an effective warlord: Sher Mohammad Akhundzada “SMA”
  • he was governor of Helmand in 2001-2005
  • during this time, not a single bomb was dropped in Helmand, there was no Taliban or insurgent activity, and the province was very peaceful
  • he ran a large opium production business, which US and her allies disliked, but he kept the peace
  • he was kicked out by Karzai (by influence from US) in 2005 after they found 9 tons of opium in his offices.
  • what happened after he was kicked out? The province went to shit. Taliban activity skyrocketed, the drug trade got out of control. All hell broke loose
  • many US officials REGRETTED kicking him out afterwards cause only then did they realize how effective he was at ruling

Chapter 11: A War on Opium

• problem: The US was simply a pawn in the fight against opium
  • the US had support from the Afghan government, but it turned out that the Afghan government was protecting the poppy fields of its allies, and making the US destroy their opponents’ fields
• problem: destroying a cash-crop with nothing to replace it
  • destroying poppy production was foolish to begin with. Many Afghans made their livelihood from it
  • an Afghan farmer asked a US commander “why are you destroying our fields when it is YOUR people in the WEST who are the main consumers?” - p. 132. He simply could not comprehend it.
  • the poor poppy farmers then turned to the Taliban for justice
  • this whole operation simply made Afghans hate the US and Afghan government even more
  • one US Colonel said “of course they’re going to take up weapons and shoot at you. You just took away their livelihood. They have a family to feed.” - p. 132
• Helmand went from a peaceful province up until 2006ish, then turned into an insurgency stronghold once the foolish “war on opium” began
• so the US was never successful in limiting poppy production… but who was? The Taliban
  • when the Taliban ruled, Mullah Omar declared poppy farming haram and illegal
  • the UN estimated that poppy production dropped 90% during their rule in the late 90s/2001
  • the people were too scared to go against Taliban edicts
• in fact, poppy production INCREASED when the US started to pump billions into the Afghan anti-narcotics department! Just shows how useless the US is
• problem: US and her allies couldn’t come to a true and confident decision on their opium stance
  • the CIA didn’t want to get involved cause they didn’t want to hurt relationships with warlords
  • the military didn’t want to get involved because they were afraid of soldier casualties and didn’t think it was their job to handle drugs
  • NATO simply couldn’t agree on the best way forward
  • overall, there was a lot of infighting between agencies within the US and agencies internationally
  • why was there so much indecision?
    • on the one hand, no one likes drugs. On the other, the US knew that by destroying poppy production, rural Afghans would turn against them, and they needed all the support they could get
    • even Karzai was hesitant. In public, he declared a holy war against opium, but in private he wasn’t so sure
• problem: they wanted to see short-term results
  • the fight against poppy farming is a long-term battle. You must have projects on rural development so it could replace the need for poppy farming
  • the US was too fixated on wanting short-term results. The entire operation was doomed from the get-go

Part 4: Obama’s Overreach, 2009-2010

Chapter 12: Doubling Down

• General David McKiernan, commander of US and NATO troops in Afghanistan, was fired in May 2009
  • why? No reason. He did nothing wrong. He was a good enough commander. They said they simply needed a ‘fresh set of eyes’
  • real reason: he was honest about the US performance in Afghanistan. He said it as it is. The US government didn’t like that.
  • this firing told a message to the rest of the army: tell the truth and you’re done
• the Obama administration continued everything Bush was doing. Nothing changed!

Chapter 13: “A Dark Pit of Endless Money”

• Obama increased the troop count to 100k in Afghanistan
  • I think the highest amount Bush had was 60k, but when Obama took office there was 35k or so
• Obama increased aid from $6billionin2008to$17 billion in 2010
  • mainly on reconstruction projects; anything that could turn the populace into pro-Karzai
• problem: too much aid money
  • Obama sent too much aid money too quickly; it was overflowing like water overflows a small funnel
  • much of the money was going into the hands of overpriced contractors and corrupt Afghan officials
• the US built a fancy police station… but it reflects the problems repeated in previous chapters:
  • the Afghan police chief couldn’t even open the door! The knob was something he’s never seen before
  • this reflects a problem repeated earlier: the US NEVER consulted the Afghans on anything!
• problem: useless projects
  • the US spent too much on projects the Afghans didn’t need or want
  • example: post-secondary schools. They were rarely any jobs in Afghanistan requiring higher education. Why build so many schools?
  • example: normal schools. There were rarely enough teachers, and the US army was building TOO many schools. Eventually those buildings were used by the Taliban as bomb making factories
  • example: power plants in rural areas. These people were used to life without power. Why did the US think these projects would convince them to abandon the Taliban and become pro-Karzai? They didn’t care for it. Besides, these projects were a big bust anyways, too costly for the US
• the reason for all this aid money and projects was to win Afghan support, to convince Afghans to support the Karzai government, to convince Afghans to abandon the Taliban, etc
• problem: the US were being fooled… again! Tricked into construction projects
  • this is another repeated problem
  • the US would build something, the Taliban would blow it up, then the US would pay an Afghan construction firm to rebuild it… turns out the Afghan firm and Taliban were working together and planned it all! It was all a trick to make money
• problem: US military focusing on enemy-controlled areas
  • the US military was desperately trying to win over support in traditionally Taliban controlled areas so they began many constructions projects there
  • even the Afghan government was confused why they were doing that. It was not a good strategy because it was still unsafe
  • a better strategy would’ve been to focus on the peaceful areas, develop them like crazy, then the rest of the country would want that same amount of development
• problem: money was being mismanaged like crazy
  • as part of CERP, a congress funded aid for US commanders in Afghanistan for projects, $2.3 billion was used up
  • in a 2015 audit, only $890 million was accounted for in projects. Why the HELL did the rest go? No one knows

Chapter 14: From Friend to Foe

• this chapter covers the backstory and rise of Karzai
• he was the son of a politician. Hailing from the Popalzai tribe from Kandahar, he went to school in Kabul and India
• he was a moderate with support from all ethnic groups in Afghanistan
• he served as deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s government in the 90s
• in 2001, living in exile in Pakistan, he returned to Afghanistan to lead a militia against the Taliban, after the US asked him to
• all these reasons led to him being a perfect candidate in the eyes of the US… less than 10 years later that would change dramatically
• he was in southern Afghanistan fighting the Taliban when he received the call that the people at the Bonn Conference elected him as president of the interim government
• problem: the US army/government and the CIA were working against each other
  • on the one hand, the US government was urging Karzai to punish his brother for drug trafficking, on the other hand the CIA was FUNDING Karzai’s brother, helping him establish a militia, and making him into a regional powerhouse and warlord in the south
  • you can imagine Karzai was upset and angry at the US government’s demands to punish his brother when it was the CIA propping his brother up!
• Karzai started to distance himself and even criticize the US due to 3 major events
  • in 2005 the Bush government sent Zalmay Khalilzad to Iraq as ambassador, letting him go as Afghan ambassador. Karzai had built up a great relationship with him, considering they were both Pashtuns. Karzai did NOT like this
  • the issue with this brother, see above
  • in 2008 there were a string of terrible attacks by the US army against civilians. These were all accidental of course, but nonetheless many civilians died.
• after these events, Karzai did not shy away from bashing the US in public, on the news, in interviews, etc, which caused the US to further dislike him

Chapter 15: Consumed by Corruption

• in 2009 there was another election. The US accused Karzai of election fraud and corruption
• problem*: the US fueled and exasperated the corruption problem
  • the US, since 2001 fueled the corruption problem. They poured so much money into Afghanistan with no auditing on where it was going.
  • the US heavily relied on bribery to get their way, which fuels corruption. They would bribe members of parliament to support US backed policies, they would bribe warlords for support, etc
  • then in 2009 they started to complain about it!
  • the Afghan people could notice this corruption, so who did they turn to? The Taliban. At least the Taliban enforced law and order and wasn’t corrupt
• “Our biggest single project, sadly and inadvertently, of course, may have been the development of mass corruption.” - p. 185, Ryan Crocker, top US Diplomat in Kabul under Bush and Obama
• in 2009 the US sent a group of lawyers and advisors to assess the corruption in Afghanistan
  • the result: they found the single biggest generator of corruption was the US Military / the Pentagon
  • furthermore, 18% of US funds were being paid to the Taliban!
    • the US paid off the Taliban and other warlords for safe passage when transporting goods like fuel
• by the time the US fully realized the corruption in Afghanistan that THEY caused, it was too far gone. They couldn’t do anything to reverse it or even ‘lightly punish’ the Afghan parties involved
  • in 2010 they tried. The seized documents from a corrupt Afghan bank, New Ansari Money Exchange
  • they ended up arresting Karzai’s senior aide, Zia Salehi. Karzai stepped in and freed him. The US anti-corruption efforts ended there.
  • At this point Karzai was done working with the US. He was so corrupt himself he stopped any anti-corruption efforts
• a big corruption scandal erupted with Kabul Bank. Despite being heavily involved, the US failed to see the corruption until it was too late
  • Karzai, and many others were involved in the corruption

Part 5: Things Fall Apart, 2011-2016

Chapter 16: At War with the Truth

• in 2011 the US killed Bin Laden in Pakistan
  • Obama started to bring troops back home, the number went from 100k to 67k by summer 2012
• in 2012, the US was publicly saying things were turning in their favor. They would tout random statistics, like more students are enrolled in school than ever before, etc… but it was all a lie
  • in 2020 a special inspector general for Afghanistan testified that all of those numbers were based on unverified metrics. It was all fake.
• the generals and soldiers on the field were honest, but the bureaucrats in Washington, government officials, etc, were the ones lying
  • the army couldn’t be honest, otherwise they’d lose their jobs. Publicly, the often lied too. It was in the behind the scenes “lessons learned” recordings where the army officials were honest
• even with real metrics, they would spin them to look positive
  • example: there’s a 50% increase in Taliban attacks this year compared to last… the US officials would argue that shows the Taliban is getting desperate, so it means the US is winning
• another key metric is Afghan civilian casualties, which the US refused to keep track of properly
  • the UN tracked it, and showed that year by year, civilians casualties was going up.
  • not a good look for the US

Chapter 17: The Enemy Within

• 2012 marked the stark rise in Afghan forces killing their foreign allies
• problem: the US under Obama was training Afghan forces too rapidly, causing the ‘insider threat’ phenomenon to skyrocket
  • at this point, they were training the enemy!
  • the more people they were training, the more likely there would be insurgents in the Afghan ranks
  • the US should’ve done the training more strategically, slower, with more care
• the insider threat risk caused trust to crumble between Afghan forces and their western allies
• but are the Afghans solely to blame? No
  • US troops committed acts to destroy the trust
  • in 2012, US troops were filmed peeing on dead Taliban bodies
  • in the same year, US troops burned Qurans at Bagram air base
  • in the same year, a US soldier massacred 16 innocent villagers in Kandahar
• problem: the Afghan army and police had a large amount of ‘ghost’ personnel
  • i.e. personnel that didn’t exist
  • Afghan forces seemed formidable on paper, but around 60k did not even exist!
  • many Afghan commanders were pocketing their salaries to make themselves rich
  • the US didn’t implement the proper checks and balances to ensure this problem didn’t occur
  • in addition, many Afghan forces would collect paychecks then go AWOL.
    • in 2013, 30k soldiers deserted the Afghan army
• problem: the bigger issue lies in the first problem of this chapter, that the US tried to build a brand new army way too quickly
• it was around 2013 when the US would give more and more responsibility to the Afghan forces to protect territory. That led to the Taliban expanding their own territory and sphere of influence
• problem: the regular Afghan peoples hated both the Taliban and the Afghan government
  • why would they bother fighting the Taliban when the government is disliked too? The government isn’t doing anything to help them

Chapter 18: The Grand Illusion

• Obama declared the end of the war in 2014… but it wasn’t really the end. Troops remained, airstrikes continued, and the war was still in full force
• in 2015 a new group entered Afghanistan: ISIS
• this same year, the US finally came to the realization that the Taliban are not the ‘enemy’. Instead, a peace deal needs to be made with them
• by the time Obama left office in 2017, only about 8k troops remained in Afghanistan
• the Taliban at this time were gaining territory and were on the offensive

Part 6: Stalemate, 2017-2021

Chapter 19: Trump’s Turn

• The first thing Trump did was send more troops to Afghanistan. Troop count went from 8k to 14k
• the ironic thing was that in the years leading up to the election, Trump repeatedly bashed Obama for getting involved in Afghanistan. He believed the US should pull out entirely
  • at the beginning of his term he still believed that, but his generals advised against a rapid pull-out because that would cause Afghanistan to collapse and become another terrorist safe-haven
• Trump also doubled the amount of airstrikes. The number continued to go up til 2020
• during this time civilians casualties doubled from previous years
• by 2018 the Taliban had 60k troops

Chapter 20: The Narco-State

• from 2002 to 2017, despite US efforts, the production of opium increased
• an Air Force Major said that whenever someone tells him “Afghanistan doesn’t have the capacity to do anything” he replies with “well they’ve got the capacity to supply the entire world’s worth of opium” - p. 255
• all these years the US launched many programs and offensives to reduce opium production, but nothing worked
• problem: The US focus on eradicating poppy farming only alienated Afghans and made them side with the Taliban
  • the US intended on diminishing the Taliban lifeline via destroying poppy farming, but that didn’t work. More farms and more factories would just pop up.
• problem: corruption was so rampant that drug-lords would rarely get prosecuted
  • people in the Afghan government protected them, the drug lords bribed judges, etc

Chapter 21: Talking with the Taliban

• in 2019 a Taliban delegation met up with US officials in Qatar
• This was Trump’s idea: he wanted the US to finally leave Afghanistan without it looking like a defeat. The best way to do that was to broker a deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban
• the US, since defeating the Taliban in 2001, had several opportunities to negotiate with the Taliban when the US had the upper hand, but they either outright refused to or the conditions were not right
• finally, years later, they all came to the negotiating table. But at this point, the Taliban were very powerful and had negotiating power
  • they even captured a US soldier to use in a prisoner trade-off. 1 US soldier for 5 Taliban senior leaders

Main Idea of the Book

This book specifically tackles the history of the 20 year US war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021. Throughout the book, US failures/mistakes in Afghanistan are highlighted. The overall idea of this book is that the US war was a general failure and the American people were misled by their government and the media.