Afghanistan A Cultural and Political History

Favourite Quotes

“I have been a Pakistani for thirty years, a Muslim for fourteen hundred years, and a Pashtun for five thousand years.” p. 20

“Afghanistan got rid of foreign occupiers by making the country so ungovernable that they wanted to leave. This strategy… now came to haunt the Afghans themselves.” - p. 255

Detailed Summary

Introduction

• Afghanistan lies in the center of 3 major geographic areas:
  • Central Asia above it
  • Indian subcontinent to the right
  • Iranian plateau to the left
• due to it’s position in the center of these 3 major areas, it has been a common conflict zone historically

Chapter One: People and Places

• “I have been a Pakistani for thirty years, a Muslim for fourteen hundred years, and a Pashtun for five thousand years.” p. 20
• ethnic breakdown of the major groups
  • Pashtuns = 40%. Further details page 25
  • Tajiks = 30%. Further details page 26
  • Hazaras = 15%. Further details page 26-27
  • Uzbeks and Turkmens = 10%. Further details page 27
    • Uzbeks arrived in Afghanistan in the 1500s as nomadic conquerors
    • Turkmens export the famous Afghan carpets and karakul sheep skins
    • They are of Turkic descent
  • Aimaqs = 5%. Persian speakers, but commonly thought of as Turkic descent. Page 27-28
• ethnic breakdown of the smaller groups. Collectively they make up 3% of the population
  • Nuristanis and Pashai = Nuristanis were independent until 1895, still holding on to their polytheistic religion and a language unique to the other languages of Afghanistan - pg 28.
    • Commonly thought of as descendants of Alexander the Great. Blondism is common in their genes.
  • Qizilbash = Shia Turkic people, but today are Persian speaking. They helped the Pashtuns start the original Afghan state in the 1700s. - pg. 29
  • Baluch = speak Baluchi. Most of them live in Iran and Pakistan
  • Arabs = descendants of Arabian armies that conquered central Asian in the 700s. They speak Persian now - pg. 29
  • Pamiris = they speak Pamiri languages like Wakhi, Shughni, or Roshani. They are Ismaili. They are commonly called “Pamir Tajiks” or “mountain Tajiks” but they are not Tajiks
  • Jats = gypsies from India
  • Kyrghyz = Turkic group from Kyrgyzstan. They live in the Wakhan corridor in Badakhshan
• Subsistence agriculture (farming for yourself and your family) is very common, even today.
  • when given a choice between producing more (to earn a profit) or working less, they choose the latter - p. 34
• most Nomads are Pashtuns - p. 39
• religion in Afghanistan plays a central role. Afghanistan even before the Taliban was an Islamic government, but this is descriptive, not prescriptive. It simply means Afghanistan is full of Muslims, not that it’s trying to impose a religious agenda - p. 41
• Herat was the historic capital of Aria in the Persian empire - p. 49
• Herat was the capital of the Timurid empire in the 15th century - p. 49
• Kandahar was called “Arachosia” by the ancient Persians - p. 50
• Kandahar is where the Durrani dynasty was established - p. 51
• Balkh is called the “Mother of cities” by the Arabs - p. 51
  • it is one of the oldest urban centers of the world
  • capital of Ancient Bactria
  • allegedly the home of Zoroaster
  • richest of all provinces in the Persian empire
• Balkh is in the north and full of Uzbeks and Turkmens, but Persian still remains dominant - p. 52
• Peshawar was the historic winter capital for Afghan empires in the past - p. 53
• Peshawar is Pashtun dominated and has always been part of Afghanistan. In 1834, the Sikhs took over and later the British defeated them and took control of Peshawar
• Afghanistan is difficult to place: is it part of the Middle East, Central Asia, or Southeast Asia (Indian subcontinent)? The best answer is none. Rather it’s part of “Turko-Persia”, both geographically and culturally. More explanation page 54-55

Chapter Two: Conquering and Ruling Premodern Afghanistan

• Afghanistan was an attractive target for conquer because it was an access point to rich lands like India and Central Asia. It also acted as trading routes - p. 66
• for the past 2.5 thousand years, Afghanistan has always simply been a part of a larger empire, very rarely being the base of operations - p. 66
  • some exceptions exist like the Kushan, Ghaznavid, Ghorid, and Durrani empires
  • even in these cases, although the base of operations was in Afghanistan, these empires got most their revenue from India or Persia, which they had control over
• the first Pashtun empire was Durrani in 1747, before that for 700 years Afghanistan was controlled by Turko-Mongolian people
• Pashtun history states that their ancestor, Qais, became Muslim during Muhammad’s time. This is likely not true - p. 91
• the mountain region of the Hindu Kush and Kabul remained non-Muslim well into the 11th century - p. 91
• it took 4 or 5 centuries for Pashtun territories to become Muslim
• in 1500, there were 3 empires with Turkic roots splitting Afghanistan between them - p. 92
  • Safavids in Iran: Herat and the lower Helmand region of Sistan
    • Abdali (Durrani) Pashtuns dominated this region
  • Mughals in India: Kabul and east Afghanistan.
    • Babur, founder of the Mughals, held Kabul as his capital
    • Ghilzai Pashtuns dominated east Afghanistan from Ghazni to Qandahar. This area periodically switched between Safavid and Mughal control, but eventually went to the Safavids for good
  • Uzbeks in Transoxiana: Balkh, Kunduz, north Afghanistan
• page 95-97 has history of how Durrani empire was established

Chapter Three: Anglo-Afghan Wars and State Building in Afghanistan

First Anglo-Afghan War

• before the Anglo-Afghan war, the British were friendly with Afghanistan and viewed them as an ally against the Persian empire which was a Russian ally. But later, the British thought it’d be best to install Shuja, the exiled former ruler of Afghanistan currently living in India, on the Afghan throne. This kicked off the war
  • the ruler in this time was Dost Muhammad Khan. He ruled a weak a fractured Afghanistan. Revenue was very little, Herat and Kandahar were basically both independent.
• The first part of the first Anglo-Afghan war (1838-1842) was won by the British; they installed Shuja, Dost Mohammad Khan was exiled to India.
• Shuja didn’t really rule, it was the British calling all the shots
• the British led reforms in military - they removed the system of irregular troops and instead opted for a central military commanded by Kabul - p. 118-120
  • this led to more money for the Kabul government because less was being paid to the tribal chiefs
• the British tax reforms led to the Afghan government making lots more money - p. 121
• Many citizens did not like the British reforms
  • Ghilzai chiefs were angry that their stipends were being cut. This led to a revolt
• Due to unhappiness, tribes rose up and revolted against the British and eventually defeated them. These battles were led by Akbar Khan, son of Dost Muhammad.
  • the result of the First Anglo-Afghan war was an Afghan victory
• In the fall of 1842, the end of the war, the British came back to sack Kabul. The defeated every Afghan resistance, but in the winter of the same year they left.
• Dost Muhammad returned and ruled Afghanistan once again
• Dost Muhammad’s second reign was a better. He took advantage of the reforms the British put into place. The new centralized army helped Dost have full control over the country. He increased the annual revenue significantly - p. 127
• the Afghan government received aid from the British empire. Both parties benefited from this - p. 133
• Second Anglo-Afghan War happened in 1878 - 1880
• Dost Muhammad placed his family members in positions of power, and his sons as regional governors. This ensured stability during his reign, but turmoil after his death
  • his sons fought each other for power after Dost died
• Dost’s son Sher Ali succeeded him, but a civil war broke out. Explained in page 136-137
• Sher Ali really improved the state -
  • he fully established a national army free of ‘irregular’ troops. His army mainly consisted of Ghilzai and Wardak Pashtuns - p. 137
  • he improved the tax program so there was more revenue for the state
• Even with Sher Ali’s reforms, the rural and remote areas were still self-administered following a law of Shariah and Pashtunwali
• “all people are advancing in the arts of peace and civilization. It is only we Afghans who remain the ignorant asses we have always been.” - p. 139
• Sher Ali’s reign marked the time when Afghanistan as a country started to become aware of what other countries think of it, so they started to modernize and progress - p. 139

Second Anglo-Afghan War

• Second Anglo-Afghan War started because the British were mad that the Afghans accepted a Russian delegation into Kabul while refusing British delegation during the time of Russian-British tensions
• The British invaded and quickly took over key areas. Sher Ali died at the start of the war. His son Yaqub became Amir. Yaqub quickly signed a treaty with the British which gave the British control of Afghan foreign affairs and established a permanent delegation inside Kabul. This happened in 1880
  • this marked the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War and a British victory

Aftermath of the Second Anglo-Afghan War

• Many Afghans were unhappy with the treaty. The rioted in Kabul and killed the British delegation. The British responded by occupying Kabul and taking Yaqub to India as prisoner - p. 141
• The British offered the Amir position to Abdur Rahman Khan, grandson of Dost Muhammad Khan. He accepted. At this time, Herat was independent under Muhammad Ayub Khan, the son of Sher Ali and brother of Yaqub.
  • So it was Abdur Rahman ruling the North and East (Turkestan and Kabul)
  • Ayub ruling the west and Herat
  • The British ruling the south, Kandahar, although they did not intend on staying
• The war kept going until 1881 when the British finally evacuated Kandahar. Ayub quickly took over Kandahar
• Now, a civil war started between Ayub in Herat and Kandahar, versus Abdur Rahman in Turkestan and Kabul
  • Ayub had a larger army and a stronger claim to the throne, but Abdur Rahman was a hardened military commander
• The two sides met in battle in Kandahar, Ayub having the larger army. Abdur Rahman won. Ayub fled. Herat revolted against him after they learned of his defeat. He fled to Persia but later to India after the British offered him asylum and a pension - p. 146
• After the civil war, Abdur Rahman proceeded to solidify his control over the country. He ruled violently but effectively. There were lots of revolts during his reign but he defeated them soundly. He had effective control over the entire land, something previous rulers struggled with - p. 147
• Abdur Rahman was an ally of the British who supplied him with finances
• Abdur Rahman’s goal was to reduce the autonomy and political/military power of 3 groups:
  • eastern Pashtun tribes who were anti-British
  • his rival cousins who ruled Turkestan
  • non-Sunni ethnic groups in rural parts of the country that typically fell out of Kabul’s direct control
• He went to war with the Ghilzai, in which the latter lost thousands of soldiers. They never revolted after that again
• He went to war with his cousin Ishaq, governor of Turkestan. He won.
• He went to war with the Hazaras and Kafirs in Kafiristan. He converted the latter and renamed the province to Nuristan. Up to 10k of their men were enlisted in the national army - p. 151
• Abdur Rahman created regions within provinces. This removed the power that powerful provinces like Herat and Kandahar had by splitting it.
• Abdur Rahman focused too much on his army and increasing taxes and overlooked other aspects of state like infrastructure, education, communication, and most importantly, natural resources
  • he was aware of the rich mineral deposits yet refused to tap into it in fear that foreign powers would interfere - p. 152-153
• The British established the Durand line, separating Pakhtunkhwa from the rest of Afghanistan. Abdur Rahman was against this but couldn’t do much about it being he relied on the British economically - p. 154
• Although Abdur Rahman was very religious on the outside, his affirmed his state was secular and his laws took precedence over Shariah laws - p. 158-160
  • From what I can tell, he simply used Islam as a tool for control
• Ahmad Shah Durrani marked the start of the history of Afghanistan, while Abdur Rahman marked the start of Afghanistan as a nation-state
• Abdur Rahman laid the framework that basically all future leaders of Afghanistan tried to follow, but failed. The difference seems to be that Abdur Rahman was a diligent barber, i.e. persistently shaving the hair to keep the head bald, page 162-163 has more explanation

Chapter Four: Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century: State and Society in Conflict

• 20th century Afghanistan can be broken down into 3 eras
  • 1901-1929
  • 1929 - 1978
  • 1978 - 2001
• 1901 - 1929 was the era of Amanullah attempting (and failing) to modernize Afghanistan after the reign of his father, Amir Habibullah, who was a conservative - p. 169
  • this era ended in a Tajik bandit naming himself Amir and ruling for 9 months before being killed
• 1929 - 1978 was the era when King Nadir Khan came into power and his family retained power this entire time. This era was relatively peaceful and stable, and progress was being made
• in 1973, Daoud Khan ousted his cousin, King Zahir Shah, and established a republic
  • Daoud suppressed the Islamists heavily. He was allied with the socialists
• in 1978, Daoud’s socialists allies led a coup and took power, effectively ending the 230 year reign of the Durranis - p. 170
  • these socialists were Ghilzai Pashtuns
• 1978 - 2001 can be broken down into 3 parts
  1. 1978 - 1992: bloody coup that brought the socialists into power occurred in 1978. Lots of internal dissent led to the Soviets invading to bring stability to the Afghan communists in 1979. In 1989 the Soviets retreated after battling Mujahideen. The Afghan communist party under Najibullah collapsed in 1992.
  2. 1992 - 1996: The fall of the communists led to a new war between the Mujahideen factions. Each controlled an area in Afghanistan but no specific group was strong enough to defeat all others. Burhanuddin Rabbani was the president in Kabul from 1992-1996, until the Taliban took over, but his government was still recognized as the Afghan government until 2001
  3. 1996 - 2001: The Taliban, with Pakistan’s help took power in Kabul in 1996, and took the entire country by 1999, except the northeast which was controlled by the Northern Alliance (Masood and Rabbani)
• the problem is this: using state power to change Afghan society without the cooperation of its people - p. 173
  • this is the reason why all governments in the 20th century collapsed: Amanullah in 1929, Daoud in 1978, communists in 1992, and the Taliban in 2001
• Abdur Rahman was successful because he never tried to change Afghan society, his only focus was on taxation and security, and of course staying in power

1901-1929

• Abdur Rahman Khan died in 1901, and was succeeded by his son Habibullah Khan in the same year. Habib reigned from 1901 - 1919
• During Habib’s reign, there were 2 factions with political power:
  • the religious faction, which included Habib’s younger brother Nasrullah (became Amir when Habib died)
  • the nationalist/modernist faction influenced by Mahmud Tarzi, an admirer of Ataturk. This included Habib’s sons Amanullah and Inyatullah
• Habib was quite unpopular during his reign. Pages 178-179. He was found dead in his tent in 1919 and his brother Nasrullah succeeded him
• Nasrullah only ruled for a few days before his nephew, Amanullah (3rd son of Habib) became amir. Amanullah had the advantage of having control over Kabul’s military and being a leader in the modernist faction, having lots of allies in the capital. Nasrullah couldn’t put up any resistance. Amanullah arrested his uncle Nasrullah, where he died a few years later - p. 181
• Amanullah ruled from 1919 - 1929
• Amanullah called for a jihad for independence against the British. This was a smart move became it united both the religious and modernist factions
  • ultimately, the British and Amanullah signed a treaty that gave Afghanistan full independence - p. 181
• Amanullah made significant cultural reforms like rights and education for woman, laws against polygamy, laws against child marriage, abolition of slavery, etc
• Amanullah was very pro-Khilafa, making him respected by the religious faction. He even considered declaring Afghanistan as the new Khilafa when the Ottomans collapsed - p. 182
• in 1924, there was a major rebellion in Khost, which saw tons of Pashtun tribes rise against the reforms of Amanullah. They saw these reforms as un-Islamic and infringing on their way of life, Pashtunwali
  • Amanullah won, but with great loss of life
• in 1927, Amanullah and his wife did a world tour, travelling to India, Egypt, Britain, Italy, France, etc - p. 188
  • this is the first time an Afghan Amir ever travelled beyond India, let alone non-Muslim Europe
  • it was also the first time any Amir let his wife play such a public role (she was unveiled too)
• After this world tour, Amanullah returned to Afghanistan and put forward even more reforms to secularize Afghanistan
  • these included schooling for girls, abolishing hijab, replacing qadis with secular judges, moving Jumu’ah to Thursday, prohibiting polygamy for government officials, etc - p. 189
• Modernists who were allied with Amanullah were against the pace of change he was doing. This includes his father in law Mahmud Tarzi and his brother Inyatullah
• A civil war broke out in 1929. This is what led to the end of Amanullah’s reign.
  • the reason for the war was the same as the Khost rebellion - general dislike towards the new reforms
  • the rebels were led by Habibullah Kalakani, a Tajik. His army were at the gates of Kabul when Amanullah abdicated. His brother Inyatullah became king, but only for a few days. Kalakani was declared king
• Kalakani didn’t last long, mainly due to 2 reasons
  • he was an outsider, a non-Pashtun
  • he was bad with finances. The treasury ran dry very fast and he didn’t know what to do
• Kalakani lasted 10 months in power
• Amanullah did try to take power back: he went to Kandahar to muster up an army to attack Kalakani, but was defeated
  • ultimately, Amanullah fled to India and never returned to Afghanistan. He lived the rest of his life in Italy in exile
• Assisting Amanullah with his return in Kandahar was Muhammad Nadir Khan, the great-grandson of Sultan Muhammad Khan, the Amir in 1823 (right before Dost Muhammad Khan)
  • It was Nadir Khan who advised Amanullah to leave to Europe
• Nadir Khan took the lead of the war against Kalakani and eventually defeated him and became king himself. He ruled from 1929 - 1933

1929 - 1978 (The Musahiban Dynasty)

• the ascension of Muhammad Nadir Khan was a dynastic change: the descendants of Dost Muhammad Khan were replaced by the Musahibans
  • Tribe structure: Durrani > Barakzai > Muhammadzais
  • The Musahibans are a collateral line of the Muhammadzais, descending from Sultan Muhammad Khan (reign 1823)
  • both Nadir Khan and Amanullah are part of Muhammadzais, but Amanullah is a direct descendant of Dost Muhammad Khan, which is considered the main line
• Not much happened during Nadir Khan’s short 4 year reign other than quelling a rebellion in 1930. In 1933 he was assassinated and succeeded by his young son Zahir Shah who was king for the next 40 years
• The Musahiban reign was very different: the economy started to shift away from heavy taxation towards other sources of revenue for the state. It reached the point where the state was barely taxing the rural areas, which led to internal stability - p. 198
  • if we analyze most rebellions in the past in Afghanistan, they were started due to heavy taxation
• When Nadir Khan died in 1933, Zahir Shah became king at age 19 but was a figurehead, his uncles were ruling behind the scenes. Zahir Shah took the reigns himself in 1963
• In 1973, while Zahir was in Italy, Daoud took power in a bloodless coup - p. 200
• Slow social change was happening too: for example the hijab stopped being mandatory in the 60s, during Zahir Shah’s time - p. 201
  • social change was really only happening in Kabul. The rulers didn’t want to enforce these changes on the rural populations cause they wanted to avoid revolts
• During this time Afghanistan started mass exporting cotton, furs, fruits, opium, etc - p. 203
• The state took advantage of political situations: example, they took advantage of US and Soviet Union by making them compete for development in Afghanistan. This gave Afghanistan ton of money in foreign aid to the point where 2/3 of the revenue came from foreign aid - p. 205
• Nazi Germany was one of Afghanistan’s biggest allies in the late 30s and 40s, providing them with aid, trade agreements, etc - p. 207
• After WW2, Afghanistan was in a really bad shape. It decreased economically, social change started to slow down, etc - p. 208
• During the cold war Afg wanted to build an alliance with the US but they refused. So they turned to the Soviets who were more than happy to provide $25 million worth of tanks and military equipment - p. 209
  • The US, after seeing the relationship between Afg and Soviet, decided to also help Afg financially and started their own development projects there
• All these foreign grants and aid made Afg dependent on outside help
• Kabul University became the breeding grounds for political dissidents, radical groups, and anti-monarchists - p. 213
  • 2 major factions existed here: The Islamists, named Jamiat-i-Islami, officially established in 1973, founded by Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ghulam Rasul Sayyaf, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
    • They wished to establish an Islamic state, similar to the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
  • The communists, PDPA formed in 1965 under Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal. Two years later they split, the Khalq faction under Taraki, Pashtun dominated, and the Parcham faction under Karmal, Persian dominated
    • Khalq faction supported an uprising to get rid of Daoud, while the Parcham’s supported a slow rise to power
• The communists officially supported Daoud’s coup against Zahir Shah - pg. 214
• Two years after his rise to power, Daoud kicked out his communist allies. He also repressed the Islamists
• In 1975, due to Islamist repression, a young 22 year old Ahmad Shah Massoud led a rebellion in Panjshir against Daoud. It saw some success, but eventually was stopped
  • Ahmad Shah was part of the Jamiat-i-Islami with his professor at Kabul university, Burhanuddin Rabbani
• The switch from monarchy to republic meant nothing. Daoud was still part of the royal family. There was no change
• Daoud’s coup proved one thing: how easy it was to start a coup
  • this gave power to the Islamists and Communists to attempt their own coup - p. 215
• Daoud started building alliances with other countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia. His alliance with Saudi Arabia meant that the Islamist faction in Afg had to solely rely on Pakistan for aid, a country which Daoud was at odds with due to Pakhtunkhwa - p. 216
• In 1978, 5 years after ruling, Daoud was murdered in a bloody coup that brought the communists to power - p. 216
  • this ended 50 years of relative peace, the longest ever in the countries history. The entire Musahiban dyanasty, 1929-1978 was a stable and peaceful time with no major internal or external wars - p. 217
• The Musahibans improved the infrastructure, mainly for the capital cities but to a lesser extent the rest of the country
  • they built a major road system - p. 219

1978 - 2001

1978 - 1992: Communists and Mujahideen

• The Khalqi communists pulled off the coup
• This group was mainly composed of Ghilzai Pashtuns, the group that always assisted the Durranis and never took power for themselves. They are an eastern tribal Pashtun people - p. 226
• During the Mujahideen civil war that followed, most of the Pashtun leading figures on all sides with Ghilzai Pashtuns
  • Taraki, Amin, and Najibullah = communist
  • Hekmatyar, Abdul Haq, Haqqani, Mullah Omar = Islamic side
  • Durrani leadership was really rare - p. 226
• Shortly after the communists came into power, they had major internal conflict, with lots of arrests and executions of fellow members - p. 228 - 229
  • they defeated themselves eventually
• The Khalqis right away tried to implement social change on the countryside. The Parchams and their soviet advisors both advised against it. This was their downfall
• the communists were under the assumption that introducing social and economic change was easy because the Musahibans did it easily. But they overlooked one thing: the Musahibans never attempted these changes on the rural populations, while the communists did
• the communists managed to turn the entire country against them. There were even protests in Kabul - p. 233
• The communists had one saving grace, the fact that the Soviets backed them and would never let them collapse
• Taraki was deposed and killed by Amin. Amin only lasted 3 months before the Soviets invaded and killed him and installed Karmal as the ruler - p. 234
• the Soviet invasion caused all the rebellious factions to unite under one goal: kick the Soviets out
• the Mujahideen had funding coming from US and Saudi via the Pakistani ISI - p. 236
• Many of the prominent Islamists were living in Pakistan at this time and returned to Afg when the war started
• Major Islamist groups:
  • Non-Pashtun Sunnis in the north and west = Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-i-Islami
  • Pashtuns in the south and east = mostly Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami, but also parties led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Yunis Khalis
• When the Soviets invaded and installed Karmal, they removed Amin’s policies of social change. They also brought the ulama back and brought Islam back - p. 237
  • they knew that social change can’t happen too quickly
• The Soviets deployed 111k troops, enough to keep the communists in power but not enough to defeat the Mujahideen - p. 238
• commanders in the Afghan army were hesitant to fight against Mujahideen
• Dr. Najibullah took power after Karmal. He started to move away from communism and went towards nationalism. He brought the scholars back on the payroll. He was willing to compromise with the Mujahideen. He offered Ahmad Shah Masood position of defense minister. - p. 239
• Once the Soviets left, Najibullah offered the Mujahideen cease-fires and leadership positions to run their own autonomous militias - p. 244
  • 20% of the Mujahideen joined the militia system
  • 40% of the Mujahideen agreed to cease fire cause the Soviets left and they saw no reason to fight Najibullah
• The Soviets still continued to economically support Najib even after they left, which is why lots of Mujahideen started to join Najib-backed militias
• Abdul Rashid Dostom had a militia of 40k who backed Najib in the north - p. 247

1992-1996: Civil War

• In December of 1991, the Soviet Union officially collapsed. All aid to Afg stopped and the country was in a terrible situation. Najib agreed to a transition process that would create a new government through a UN-brokered conference
  • this led various resistance groups to unite so they can take power
  • These alliances were based on ethnicity. So the communist Khalqis (Pashtuns) joined Hekmatyar’s radical Islamic party.
  • Dostom’s Uzbek and Kayani’s Ismaili militias joined Ahmad Shah Masood’s Tajik forces. The Shia Hazara militia Hizb-i-Wahdat also joined them
• When Masood found out Hekmatyar intended on taking Kabul, he beat them to it and occupied it a day ahead in April 1992
• The communists were never militarily defeated, rather different communist factions joined different Mujahideen groups after the fall of the Soviets - p. 249
• Once Masood took Kabul, he made the mistake of not taking power for himself, rather he left it up to the party leaders in Peshawar like Rabbani and Hekmatyar, who didn’t even fight on the front lines themselves - p. 249
  • Masood was admired by all ethnic groups and was a smart man, so he would’ve made a great leader
• Rabbani and Hekmatyar, the leading leaders, agreed to share power, but upon arriving in Kabul all hell broke loose
  • Rabbani was president while Hekmatyar was his prime minister, but the latter didn’t like this arrangement. He refused to enter Kabul and was shelling the city. Thousands of civilians died.
• In Jan 1994, Dostom switched sides from Rabbani to Hekmatyar
  • Hekmatyar still failed to take down Rabbani
• No Mujahideen faction was receiving aid from the outside world - p. 251
  • Soviets collapsed, US had no interest, and Saudi didn’t know which Sunni group to support cause they were all killing each other
• By 1993, Afghanistan was divided among different factions
  • Ismail Khan = The west (Herat, Badghis, Farah, Ghor)
  • Dostom = the north (Mazar). His allies, the Hazaras and Ismailis controlled Baghlan
  • Masood = the northeast and Kabul
  • Haji Abdul Qadir = the east (Nangarhar / Jalalabad)
  • Jalaludin Haqqani = southeast (split) Paktia
  • Naqibullah Akhund = southeast (split) Kandahar)
• All these various factions didn’t all view themselves as potential leaders, rather they backed one of two potential rulers: Rabbani and Hekmatyar
  • it wasn’t based on ethnic group either.
  • The Pashtun Hekmatyar didn’t have unanimous Pashtun backing, many Pashtuns hated him. But he did have backing from Uzbeks and Hazaras
  • the Pashtun Akhund (Kandahar) supported Rabbani
  • Haji Qadir remained neutral
• Pakistan backed Hekmatyar, while Iran and Russia supported Rabbani - p. 253
• The problem is that both Rabbani and Hekmatyar were both unfit leaders
  • neither had a ‘homebase’. During the Soviet war, they both stayed in Peshawar so the troops were NOT loyal to them, rather were loyal to the commanders on the field like Masood
  • Both of them had unfit origins:
    • Rabbani was a Tajik from Badakhshan, a poor mountainous region that was part of Masood’s territory.
    • Hekmatyar was a Ghilzai Pashtun but had no home community in the east because his people had been resettled in the north before he was born
• “Afghanistan got rid of foreign occupiers by making the country so ungovernable that they wanted to leave. This strategy… now came to haunt the Afghans themselves.” - p. 255
  • Having gotten the name ‘graveyard of empires’ the Afghans now began digging a grave for themselves
  • no faction had enough power to claim the country their own, but they also didn’t want to compromise with other factions
  • this led to the country being very vulnerable and open to opportunistic attacks by other groups who in other circumstances would never be able to achieve dominance. This is where the Taliban come into play

1996-2001: The Taliban

• The Taliban was a cross-border movement led by Afghan Pashtuns trained in Deobandi schools in Pakistan. Its ideological roots lay in Pakistan and the Taliban leaders had close ties with religious parties in Pakistan
• These Deobandi schools attracted lots of Afghan refugee boys by offering free rooms and education - p. 255
• These Pakistan-trained Taliban joined the Mujahideen to fight against Soviets, but when the Mujahideen started fighting amongst themselves, the Taliban shifted their goal towards ending the disorder and creating a pure Islamic state along Salafist lines
  • this goal was shared by religious parties in Pakistan
• These Pakistani schools were hotbeds for radical movements
• The Taliban would recruit men who would’ve been too young to participate in the Soviet war and gave them a chance to participate in a new jihad - this was a big reason for their success - p. 256
• The Taliban invention story in 1994 has 2 variations:
  1. a reaction to the Mujahideen failing to provide law and order and being corrupt in their home province of Kandahar. Their leader Mullah Omar instructed his students (Taliban) to disarm these Mujahideen groups.
     1. this is the Taliban’s own version of the story
  2. Pakistan was frustrated with Hekmatyar’s failure to defeat Rabbani so they needed an alternative. I.e. created by Pakistan
     1. this is the likely truth. The first massing of the Taliban was in Pakistan and they easily came to seize a large arms depot from Hekmatyar’s forces. So they definitely had Pakistan help
• The strategy of the Taliban was to first target the arms depot of rival groups so that they can get small arms and large weapons like tanks
  • They recruited ex-Khalqis (communists) to maintain and operate these large weapons. These communists for some reason agreed to ‘grow long beards’ and join the Taliban who were at least fellow Pashtuns - p. 258
• Pakistan greatly helped the Taliban with aid and weapons. Without this the Taliban would not have survived - p. 258
• The Taliban took control of Kandahar in 1994 and quickly attacked Kabul in Jan 1995. Hekmatyar was forced to flee. But they lost against Masood
  • the Taliban’s victories until then were usually because they bribed local militia leaders so they rarely had a real fight. Masood gave them a real fight - p. 259
• Upon retreat, Ismail Khan of Herat attacked the Taliban from the west, defeating them. This forced Taliban back into Kandahar. Unfortunately Ismail Khan and Rabbani were not on the best terms. If Rabbani helped, they could’ve defeated the Taliban for good. Instead Rabbani worked to undermine Ismail Khan’s leadership in Herat
• The Taliban, after these defeats, recruited lots more from Pakistan and attacked Herat and took over while the area was weak. They then proceeded to attack Kabul again but from the east this time, defeating the Nangarhar shura and Paktia.
• Masood was not expecting the Nangarhar shura to be defeated so he was blindsided. He retreated without a fight and took his army back to Panjshir where he established the Northern Alliance with Dostom. - p. 260
• Taliban attempted an attack on Northern Afg in May 1997. They were initially successful in subduing the Uzbeks and Tajiks, but were driven out and killed in large numbers quite quickly - p. 260
• The Taliban lost many men so were recruiting non-Afghans from Pakistan, Arabs, Chechens, etc - p. 260
  • This newly reinforced army allowed them to take Mazar in 1998 after their initial failure
  • The next month they took Bamiyan, the Shia Hazara center, finally taking control of the entire country except for the north east controlled by Masood
• The Taliban for the rest of their rule, never took Panjshir and the north east
• Taliban government structure was made up of a supreme leader, Mullah Omar, who had an inner shura of 6 members. They held most power - p. 261
  • Regular administration were in the hands of a 9 member central shura that reported to Mullah Omar
• In 1999 they tried to change and bring back the ministries that existed during Zahir Shah’s time, but the Taliban proved unwilling to make the transition and Taliban governors continued to serve as military commanders reporting directly to Mullah Omar and not to the ministries in Kabul - p. 261
  • Mullah Omar ruled from Kandahar so his minister who often left out of the decision making process
• Their social and religious policies became widely unpopular, especially in the cities
  • their ideology was a mix of Salafism and Pashtunwali
• Many including Al-Azhar scholars argued that the Taliban had no business enforcing Sharia law because their knowledge of it was lacking - p. 262
• The Taliban were struggling to gain legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans because their regime was too dominated by Pakistan and Al-Qaeda - p. 263
• The UN continued to provide humanitarian aid to the Afghans during Taliban rule - p. 265
• The Taliban welcomed all jihadi groups to Afghanistan including al Qaeda, Chechens, Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Kashmiri separatists - p. 266
• Taliban had one major difference with al Qaeda, they only believed in Jihad for Afghanistan, while Al Qaeda believed in a world wide Islamic revolution - p. 267
• The above is one reason why Afghans rarely joined other jihadi groups, but another major reason is that Afghan jihadis did not share the same romantic views on Jihad as other Muslims. Afghans viewed being a ghazi (living victor of a war) as better. This is why the Taliban rejected suicide bombing - p. 268
  • this must have been an early opinion. Taliban post-2001 did suicide bombing.
• Mullah Omar was giving Bin Laden safety, rejecting both Saudi and US demands to hand over Bin Laden
• When twin towers were targeted, the Taliban still refused to hand over Bin Laden. This led to US attacking and quickly toppling the Taliban regime. - p. 269
  • The first places to get free were the north and west, followed by east and Kabul
  • Kandahar was the last to go, and the traditional Pashtun tribal leaders revolted against the Taliban and regained power

Chapter Five: Afghanistan Enters the Twenty-first Century

• Afghan people surprisingly were not opposed to US intervention. Although Afghans hate foreigners, they also viewed the Taliban as foreigners because the Taliban would consistently recruit Pakistani, Arabs, etc, into their ranks - p. 275
  • One United Front commander said it’s a situation of driving one set of foreigners using another
  • Also, since the US was so far away, Afghans didn’t view them as a threat. They only viewed neighboring countries as a threat, which is why again they preferred US to Taliban because Taliban were essentially just Pakistani agents
• Another major point was that the US intervention was not viewed as an invasion in the Afghan eyes. The US used existing anti-Taliban militias in Afg to fight the Taliban. The US assisted with air missile strikes, weapons, and money, with only a few US soldiers being in the country - p. 276
• So why didn’t the country revolt when the US sent regular troops in during Karzai’s time (like they would revolt each and every time in history)? This time was different. The people were just so sick of internal factions fighting for power and were traumatized by the civil war in the 90s, so the people just wanted safety against that - p. 277
  • they preferred US intervention over anarchy
• The ascension of Karzai marked the return of a Durrani head of state since Daoud Khan was deposed in 1978 - p. 284
  • Since then, it was mostly Ghilzai Pashtuns leading the country (Taraki, Amin, Dr. Najib, Hekmatyar, Sayyaf, Mullah Omar)
• Ghilzai pashtuns were always more dominant militarily and in times of war, but the Durranis always controlled the state
• The eastern pashtuns, Ghilzai, were egalitarian. Any person can compete for leadership - p. 285
• Ghilzai pashtuns are generally poorer and considered more rural, while Durrani pashtuns are the opposite. The Durranis live in southern Afg and are typically better educated. Their tribes are also better organized, while the Ghilzai are more archaic - p. 286
• Within the Durrani clans, the biggest rivalry is between the Popalzais and Barakzais - p. 287
  • Popalzai = produced the Sadozai lineage of Afghan Shahs who founded and ruled the Durrani empire in 1747 - 1818. Includes Karzai
  • Barakzai = Muhammadzai lineage who ruled from 1826 - 1978, including King Zahir Shah
• Although the Durranis have always been dominate in Kandahar, Mullah Omar, who came from Kandahar, was actually a Hotaki Ghilzai pashtun
  • in 1999, when Taliban ruled the country, they still feared the Durranis of Kandahar, specifically the Popalzai who were led by Abdul Ahad Karzai, father of Hamid Karzai. He moved to Quetta but the Taliban still viewed him as a threat to their stability so they assassinated him
• In the wake of 9/11 an death of Hamid Karzai’s father, Hamid returned to his tribe and clan to lead them in a successful resistance against the Taliban - p. 289
• Karzai was largely chosen as leader because he was a Durrani - p. 292
• the new 2003 constitution was very similar to Zahir Shah’s constitution in 1964. It was very centralized (all power in Kabul) and almost monarchist, just without the title - p. 299
  • the key issue in the 2003 Loya Jirga was if Afg should be centralized or federal (like Russia pre-2011). Obviously it was the former that won
• The first election was in 2004. Many candidates but only 4 were serious contenders
  • Karzai: Won with 56% of total vote
  • Qanuni: an ethnic Tajik part of the Northern Alliance
  • Dostom
  • Mohaqiq: hazara Shia, Hizb-i-Wahdat
• centralized states/governments in Afghanistan’s history have always failed, and Afg has now done it again with Karzai’s government in 2001 - p. 302
  • this means the government has control over small regional matters too like paying school teachers
• Karzai was viewed as a weak leader and made many mistakes
  • rather than fire incompetent or corrupt governors, he simply transferred them to another province - p. 303
  • he let the warlords of the civil war period have power and gave them more official positions
  • He did not use state assets to centralize power, rather he used them to create a network of personal clients bound to him - p. 304
  • Karzai had no control over the military - p. 304
• governors were chosen by Karzai, not by the people of that province, which is a problem - p. 305
• the whole country knew Karzai was being aided and funded by the US
  • Khalilzad was the American ambassador to Afghanistan, being Afghan himself. He made the hard choices cause Karzai couldn’t. This delegitimized Karzai in the eyes of Afghans - p. 310
• in 2005, the US was hailing their intervention in Afg as a victory, but a year later the Taliban resurfaced. Violent attacks and suicide bombings were on the increase - p. 319
• Afghanistan often appeared as 2 countries - p. 323
  • north, west, center = relatively stable, economically better off
    • the west had support from Iran while the north from the central Asian countries
  • east and south = Pashtun dominated, unsafe, low standard of living
    • these places border Pakistan so terrorism is alive and well
• Karzai often appeased to the Taliban in Kandahar as a way to hopefully make them quiet down. This made the rest of the non-Pashtuns in the country upset, they believed they deserved more because they were peaceful and progressing - p. 324
  • If Afg were to ever split along these lines, it would split into Khorasan (Herat, Mazar, Kabul) and Pashtunistan (the east, Kandahar)
• the areas bordering Pakistan were the hotbed of Islamists who wanted to overthrow Karzai. They had funding from Pakistan. They were the same insurgent groups and leaders fighting against the Soviets, except now they are no longer angry young men but rather aging gray beards - p. 325
• During the early 2000s, Hekmatyar still had his faction alive and well in Kunar, Nangarhar, and Nuristan - p. 326
  • Jalaluddin Haqqani also had a group in Paktia, Paktika, and Khost
  • both were close with al-Qaeda, but Haqqani was even closer
• The second rise of the Taliban had some changes - they were more ‘tolerant’. They were STILL being funded by Pakistan - p. 327
• So why didn’t the Taliban gain power again quickly? They had their own problems
  • legitimacy: their ideology was more Pakistani than it was Afghan. They were more popular in Pakistan’s Pakhtunkhwa than in Afghanistan. They heavily relied on Pakistan for aid and support
  • hypocrites: they attacked Karzai for being subservient to the US, but they themselves were subservient to Pakistan
  • location: the south, Kandahar, historically has never served as a successful base for insurgencies
    • rather it was the east or north that were successful bases
• The Taliban were accepted in Kandahar only because Karzai’s government did nothing to help Kandahar, so the traditional leadership there accepted the Taliban as an alternative - p. 329
  • This was a blow to the Taliban because it meant they couldn’t rely on their Afghan allies, they really had to rely on outsiders
• Karzai was criticized in the 2009 elections because he allied himself with warlords like Marshal Fahim
• Karzai committed electoral fraud in 2009 in order to win - p. 332
• Bush focused on the Iraq war so Afghanistan was put on a back burner, but Obama switched it around and greatly increased troops in Afg - p. 333
• The reason the US didn’t back out or reduce troops was because they were scared Afg would turn into another Islamic safehaven like it was in the late 90s. If another 9/11 happened, the political life of the US administration that pulled out of Afg would be over - p. 335

Chapter Six: Some Conclusions

• Governments that attempted centralized control did not last long: Amanullah, the communists, and the Taliban - p. 338
  • On the other hand, the Musahiban rulers maintained 50 years of peace because although in theory they proclaimed full control, in practice they did not nor did they want to
• the persistence of Afghanistan as a national state is problematic because over the millennia Afg has been viewed in terms of the major regions - p. 342-343
  • north, Mazar, also called “Turkistan”
  • south, Kandahar, also called “Loya Kandahar”
  • west, Herat
  • east, Kabul
  • central, also called “Hazarajat”
• a more stable Afghanistan therefore requires more attention towards the regions rather than a reliance on a Kabul government - p. 343
• the best rulers in Afg history allowed autonomy of these major regions rather than impose centralized control. Partnering with regional elites rather than displacing them is the best way to move forward - p. 343
  • a federal system of government would be beneficial
• the history of Afg is our best guide moving forward, as long as the economic and social situation stays the same, which it will for the near future
  • Afg is rich in mineral resources. It has lots of ways to develop economically. It’s hopefully just a matter of time before they do
• what Afg lacks today are leaders that have the talent to move the country from war to peace and lay the foundations for a stable future - p. 349
• Afghans must step up and break the cycle of violence themselves, this is the job of the new generation

Analysis

Main Idea of the Book

• This book aims to present a comprehensive overview of the MODERN Afghan state from a cultural and political perspective. So the in-depth information starts with the Anglo-Afghan wars
• it begins first by explaining the various ethnic groups and major regions/cities with a little bit of the history behind it
• a comprehensive analysis of the politics during the Anglo-Afghan wars is given in chapter three
• chapter four covers the 20th century, covering the time of Amanullah, then the Musahiban and Daoud, then Communists, then Mujahideen, then Taliban. It covers all the major political events during these times, it identifies key players, etc
• chapter five covers Karzai’s time and again identifies key players and key events

Reflections

This is a great book on the history of the Modern Afghan State Everything is covered from the political history, ethnic groups, wars, tribes, etc. Extremely comprehensive.